Post by magnum on May 11, 2020 16:39:50 GMT
What is your favorite military tactic?
The most obvious answer would be “whatever works” at the current situation since one’s tactics (and strategies) must always suit battlefield conditions, logistics, time, available weapons and troops, just to name a few of the factors that must be taken into consideration when planning an attack or defense. However, if the battlefield situation is ideal, I would prefer to use the tactics mentioned below to win the day or hold the line.
When going on the offensive
Shock Tactics (to be specific: a combination of blitzkrieg and creeping barrage) - a commander will usually open up a type of attack like this with an artillery barrage. Not me, I’ll attack with armored formations being the spearhead while the artillery bombards the enemy. Taking into account the possibility of the attack breaking through and covering a lot of ground would be accomplished quickly, the artillery would be ordered to fire at least a few miles ahead of the advancing troops. The “creeping barrage” would then move its sights ahead another few miles more when the attacking force have finished their (constantly- “moving forward) objectives and started moving again. This tactical combination requires precise coordination and communication among the attacking forces and artillery units so as to avoid “friendly fire” and ensure that the target/s in front of the “blitzkrieg” is “sufficiently” softened up.
The main drawbacks are that supplies might not be able to keep up with the advance, the need for lots and lots of shells for the supporting artillery in order to keep up the “creeping barrage” and the likely possibility that enemy lines (and fortifications) would withstand the barrage and/or the assault and part the enemy forces might be left behind allowing them to become a “threat” to the rear of the attacking troops. To compensate, I would have the spearhead bypass any position that cannot be taken “quickly enough” (a week maximum), troops following the advance (usually tasked with “mopping up” what’s left of the enemy that have survived the initial assault and dealing with bypassed enemy positions) guard the logistical “train” on the move and close air support providing additional fire against positions not hit “hard enough” by the artillery.
The payoff (for me, at least) would outweigh the losses of this offensive tactic in terms of men and material that are to act as a “mobile battering ram”. After all, the aim of shock tactics, such as “blitzkrieg” and its predecessor, the “cavalry charge”, is to immediately force the enemy to flee, if not open a gap in their lines, making them “easy pickings” with their backs turned and morale and cohesion shattered. The “heavy” losses among the attacking force is to be considered a price that must be paid for the success of the operation since they are to act as the “hammer blow” to the enemy’s “wall”.
When going on the offensive
Shock Tactics (to be specific: a combination of blitzkrieg and creeping barrage) - a commander will usually open up a type of attack like this with an artillery barrage. Not me, I’ll attack with armored formations being the spearhead while the artillery bombards the enemy. Taking into account the possibility of the attack breaking through and covering a lot of ground would be accomplished quickly, the artillery would be ordered to fire at least a few miles ahead of the advancing troops. The “creeping barrage” would then move its sights ahead another few miles more when the attacking force have finished their (constantly- “moving forward) objectives and started moving again. This tactical combination requires precise coordination and communication among the attacking forces and artillery units so as to avoid “friendly fire” and ensure that the target/s in front of the “blitzkrieg” is “sufficiently” softened up.
The main drawbacks are that supplies might not be able to keep up with the advance, the need for lots and lots of shells for the supporting artillery in order to keep up the “creeping barrage” and the likely possibility that enemy lines (and fortifications) would withstand the barrage and/or the assault and part the enemy forces might be left behind allowing them to become a “threat” to the rear of the attacking troops. To compensate, I would have the spearhead bypass any position that cannot be taken “quickly enough” (a week maximum), troops following the advance (usually tasked with “mopping up” what’s left of the enemy that have survived the initial assault and dealing with bypassed enemy positions) guard the logistical “train” on the move and close air support providing additional fire against positions not hit “hard enough” by the artillery.
The payoff (for me, at least) would outweigh the losses of this offensive tactic in terms of men and material that are to act as a “mobile battering ram”. After all, the aim of shock tactics, such as “blitzkrieg” and its predecessor, the “cavalry charge”, is to immediately force the enemy to flee, if not open a gap in their lines, making them “easy pickings” with their backs turned and morale and cohesion shattered. The “heavy” losses among the attacking force is to be considered a price that must be paid for the success of the operation since they are to act as the “hammer blow” to the enemy’s “wall”.
The above pic shows the “basic” objective of the attacking force to be assisted by
A creeping barrage that targets enemy fortifications and positions (always) a few miles ahead of the advancing troops. Whatever’s left standing as the artillery “moves its sights forward” is to be dealt with by this
Close air support aircraft or attack helicopters are to pound or suppress enemy positions that have withstood the artillery attack. They too will keep on moving forward to assist the attacking force in the offensive or when “delayed” by the enemy.
Subsequent “waves” of troops will focus on mopping-up operations, guarding the rear of the initial attack and securing the supply lines.
When on the defensive
“Pincer Defense” (basically Hannibal’s famous strategy in Cannae combined with a “flexible” defensive formation that aims to delay rather than outright stop an enemy advance along with what WWII Wehrmacht troops call a “Pakfront”) - “fixed fortifications” such as trenches and bunkers may seem to have been rendered obsolete by “mobile warfare” but they’re still a staple of military tactics and strategies since even if they can be prone to flanking maneuvers or be bypassed they can still slow down an enemy advance, giving “precious time” for the defenders to react. My defense line would consist of trenches and bunkers placed in strategic positions with the gaps secured by mobile artillery and anti-tank weapons that can be moved to provide fire to positions under “heavy stress” from enemy attack (as compared to fixed/traditional artillery which can only fire at a certain point or is too cumbersome to move to another “trouble spot”). Reserves are to be placed at the flanks of the defensive line. As I expect the attacking enemy to eventually overrun my defenses but at least be slowed down in the process, the aforementioned reserves is to attack them from their flanks. The “center is to retreat and be given to the enemy” (the defenses collapsing or being overran) with the reserves flanking the attackers (and possibly even encircling them), hence “pincer defense”.
Despite being designed to only delay the enemy advance, the defenses must still hold and slow down the attackers long enough for the reserves to get in a position that will allow them to outflank the enemy. Too fast and they might face the enemy in the front, serving only to shore up the defenses that weren’t meant to stay intact (if it stayed intact, either it’s a miracle or the enemy attack is not strong enough to begin with), but too slow and the attackers might be able to able to secure their flanks or build their own defenses to repel the reserves. However, both “less than ideal” situations can still be used to my advantage since on the former (enemy overwhelming the defenses too quickly and/or the reserves engaging too soon) I could just use the reserves to either hold the line or counterattack while for the latter (reserves engaging too late in such a way that the enemy have time to build their own defenses and/or secure their flanks) I could attempt an encirclement and circumvallation/contravallation against them, basically turning it into a siege.
When on the defensive
“Pincer Defense” (basically Hannibal’s famous strategy in Cannae combined with a “flexible” defensive formation that aims to delay rather than outright stop an enemy advance along with what WWII Wehrmacht troops call a “Pakfront”) - “fixed fortifications” such as trenches and bunkers may seem to have been rendered obsolete by “mobile warfare” but they’re still a staple of military tactics and strategies since even if they can be prone to flanking maneuvers or be bypassed they can still slow down an enemy advance, giving “precious time” for the defenders to react. My defense line would consist of trenches and bunkers placed in strategic positions with the gaps secured by mobile artillery and anti-tank weapons that can be moved to provide fire to positions under “heavy stress” from enemy attack (as compared to fixed/traditional artillery which can only fire at a certain point or is too cumbersome to move to another “trouble spot”). Reserves are to be placed at the flanks of the defensive line. As I expect the attacking enemy to eventually overrun my defenses but at least be slowed down in the process, the aforementioned reserves is to attack them from their flanks. The “center is to retreat and be given to the enemy” (the defenses collapsing or being overran) with the reserves flanking the attackers (and possibly even encircling them), hence “pincer defense”.
Despite being designed to only delay the enemy advance, the defenses must still hold and slow down the attackers long enough for the reserves to get in a position that will allow them to outflank the enemy. Too fast and they might face the enemy in the front, serving only to shore up the defenses that weren’t meant to stay intact (if it stayed intact, either it’s a miracle or the enemy attack is not strong enough to begin with), but too slow and the attackers might be able to able to secure their flanks or build their own defenses to repel the reserves. However, both “less than ideal” situations can still be used to my advantage since on the former (enemy overwhelming the defenses too quickly and/or the reserves engaging too soon) I could just use the reserves to either hold the line or counterattack while for the latter (reserves engaging too late in such a way that the enemy have time to build their own defenses and/or secure their flanks) I could attempt an encirclement and circumvallation/contravallation against them, basically turning it into a siege.
The main defense would consist of trenches to be supplemented at certain points by
These bunkers are to have either heavy machineguns, anti-tank or anti-aircraft weapons and if possible and space-allowing, all three. Any gaps in the defensive line will be taken care of by
Mobile artillery/anti-tank/anti-aircraft platforms are to serve as a “mobile ‘pakfront’ style defensive force” not only guarding the gaps between the trenches and bunkers but also moving to secure “trouble spots” in the defenses in order to further delay the enemy attack, if not outright stop it, to give time for the reserves to outflank (and possibly surround) the attackers.
Reserve troops are to be placed in the flanks of the defensive line (preferably hidden) to get into position to outflank the attackers as they breakthrough/overran defenses, reminiscent of Hannibal’s “endgame” at the Battle of Cannae (and also to prevent the enemy flanking the defenses). Precise timing for their attack is needed since “too fast” and they’ll have to hold the line (that wasn’t meant to hold) and “too slow” and they might have to resort to a siege of a now-possibly fortified enemy line.
What I’ve written above is my favorite tactic (or set of tactics) for either an offensive or defensive operation under “ideal conditions” and the assumption that the enemy would follow through with what I hoped they would do. In a real battle I (along with countless tacticians) would be pleasantly surprised if everything went according to plan since only a “brain-dead” or incompetent enemy commander would tend to react as expected by his/her adversary. Most likely, my plans would fail or need some adjustments and changes at some point in the battle as it ebbs and flows based on either side’s decisions, maneuvers, “surprises”, weapons and troop morale/resolve/discipline, just to mention some of the factors involved in determining the flow of battle.
What I’ve written above is my favorite tactic (or set of tactics) for either an offensive or defensive operation under “ideal conditions” and the assumption that the enemy would follow through with what I hoped they would do. In a real battle I (along with countless tacticians) would be pleasantly surprised if everything went according to plan since only a “brain-dead” or incompetent enemy commander would tend to react as expected by his/her adversary. Most likely, my plans would fail or need some adjustments and changes at some point in the battle as it ebbs and flows based on either side’s decisions, maneuvers, “surprises”, weapons and troop morale/resolve/discipline, just to mention some of the factors involved in determining the flow of battle.